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Pirahticulture constrains communication to nonabstract subjects which fall
within the immediate experience of interlocutors. This constraint explains a
number ofvery surprising features ofPirahti grammar and cultlfre: the absence
ofnumbers of any kind or a concept ofcounting and of any terms for
quantification, the. absence ofcolor terms, the absence of embedding, the simplest
pronoun inventory known, the absence of "relative tenses, " the simplest kinship
system yet documented, the absence ofcreation myths and fiction, the absence of
any individual or collective memory of more than two generations past, the
absence of drawing or other art and one of the simplest material cultures
documented, and the fact that the Pirahti are monolingual after more than 200
years ofregular contact with Brazilians and the Tupi-Guarani-speaking Kawahiv
[Everett 2005: 621].

Dan Everett (b. 1951) is an ex~missionary and linguist whose scholarly work of
the past 30 years focuses on the Pirahli, an indigenous tribe of the Amazon who live on
, the banks of the Maici River in Brazil. In 2005 Everett published a controversial article
entitled "Cultural Constraints on Grammar and Cognition in Pirahli" in Current
Anthropology, in which he posited that properties of the Piraha language are constrained

by cultural values that exclude grammatical and lexical elements not immediately within
the realm of personal experience (Everett 2005). Everett contends that these values
constitute a cultural principle, titled the "innnediacy of experience principle," centered
around cultural conservation and rejection of everything abstract, foreign, or nonwitnessed (Everett 2005). In his 2005 article, Everett asserts that his proposal of the
absence of certain granunatical properties in Pirahli challenge the widely accepted
theories of No am Chomsky's Universal Granunar and Charles Hockett's design features
of human language (Everett 2005). His claims also reopen the dialogue about the
disputed Whorfian Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis, asking to what extent language and

culture influence one other. In this thesis I will place Dan Everett's work on the Pirahii in
the context of these linguistic theories, criticisms and perpetual questions.
In the fIrst section of this thesis, entitled "The Case of the Pirahii," I will provide a
deeply descriptive account ofPirahii language and culture based on Everett's
ethnographic reports. First I will describe Everett's work with the Pirahiiand provide
theories about the history of the indigenous populations of the Amazon, the origins of the
Pirahii people and their language. Then I will proceed to explain Everett's hypothesis,
the immediacy of experience principle, and describe pertinent features of Pirahii
language. These features will include phonemic inventory, tonality, sentence forms,
color terms, number, quantifIers, and recursion (or "embedding"). I will spend time
particularly on those features that Everett claims to be absent in Pirahii, which are
numbers, quantifIers, color terms, and recursion.
After discussing features of Pirahii language, I will describe features ofPirahii
daily life, culture and customs according to Everett's reports, and how these elements are
used to contribute to Everett's thesis. Features of Pirahii life and culture to be discussed
include subsistence methods, patterns of sleep, rules of marriage and sex, kinship terms,

oral history and cosmology, material culture, art, technology, ritual, spirits, and social
control. Everett describes many of these features as relatively sparse or lacking in Pirahii
culture in comparison to other cultures and indigenous Amazonian tribes, positing that
some of these features require abstract thought or knowledge that is not derived from
immediate experience. He then connects these features to those allegedly absent features
of Pirahii language and contends that they are drawn from the same cultural principle, the
immediacy of experience principle (also referred to as IEP).
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In the second section of this thesis, entitled "Language Universals," I will discuss

the study oflanguage universals, recounting the work of No am Chomsky, Joseph
Greenberg, Charles Hockett, and Brent Berlin and Paul Kay. After describing
Chomsky's theories of universal grammar and the significance of recursion to human
language according to Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002), I will explain Everett's claim
that Pirahii lacks recursion, and discuss criticisms from both perspectives. Then I will
explain Charles Hockett's design features of human language, three of which Everett
claims are violated in Pirahli language. Finally, I will present Berlin and Kay's 1969
study of basic color terms, after which I will discuss the significance of color terms in
Pirahli and the ways in which translators can interpret those terms to be present or absent
in Pirahli.
The third section, entitled "The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis," will document
the historical development of the hypothesis and explain the various components of the
theory, including the work of Franz Boas, Edward Sapir, and Benjamin Lee Whorf.
In the fourth and last section, called "Discussion," I will discuss Everett's
methods and writing style. Everett's work is contentious among linguists and
anthropologists and has received significant criticism (Replies to Everett 2005: Berlin
2005; Kay 2005, Levinson 2005, Surralles 2005, Wierzbicka 2005; Nevins, Pesetsky,
Rodrigues 2007). Everett has been criticized as lacking substantial evidence for his
claims about the "gaps" or absence of features in Pirahli language as well as his claims
about the root of these gaps. Each claim about a supposedly absent feature in Pirahli has
been contested and is ambiguous due to differing interpretations of Everett's data. In a
response to Everett's 2005 article written by Andrew Nevins, David Pesetsky and Cilene
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Rodrigues (2007), most ifnot all of Everett' s claims about Pirah1l language and culture
are rejected on the grounds of alternate interpretations.
While Everett has received much criticism for his methodology, translations and
interpretations, many critics also focus on the implications of his claims for the Pirahii
people. Everett's writing style is criticized as indelicate and at times shocking, and has
been said to portray the Pirahii as primitive (Wierzbicka 2005). He is accused of
exoticizing (Wierzbicka 2005) and oversimplifying Pirah1l culture (Surraltes 2005,
Levinson 2005), as well as exaggerating the uniqueness of Pirah1l linguistic features
among the world's languages (Wierzbicka 2005, Levinson 2005, Kay 2005, Berlin 2005).
Furthermore, Everett's claim about the absence of recursion in Pirahii can be interpreted
as dehumanizing to the Pirahii because recursion is considered a fundamental element of
differentiation between animal and human communication (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch
2002). These criticisms will be discussed in the [mal section of this thesis, bringing
together the possible implications of Everett's work for theories oflanguage universals
and linguistic relativity, for the Pirahii people and for the field of linguistic anthropology.
In conclusion, Everett has presented an interesting and unusual case that should
be studied further. I agree with Everett's statement of the importance of fieldwork in
linguistic anthropology, and with his emphasis on linguistic relativity. However, I find
the way in which Everett has presented his findings to be insensitive and at times
inappropriate, as well as (perhaps unknowingly) representing a resurrection of the now
discredited anthropological interest in the "primitive mind." Everett's hypothesis about
the immediacy of experience principle is an interesting concept in theory, although I find
his descriptive works to be insufficient as definitive evidence due to their limitations and

bias. While some other scientists have aimed at reevaluating these claims, such as Peter
Gordon (1993), no other linguist has attained fluency in Piraha, which makes empirical
research and fieldwork challenging. Because Everett's work is one of the only sources of
linguistic data on the Piraha, further study must be conducted by other researchers in
order to validate Everett's claims. At present, Everett's research serves as a vehicle for
dialogue between ethnographers and theorists, causing us to revisit issues that have been
at the core of the discipline of anthropology throughout history.

I. The Case of the Piraha
DANIEL EVERETT AND THE PIRAHA.
Daniel Everett began living with the Pirahii. and studying their language in 1977.
He spent seven consecutive years living with the Pirahii. in the company of his family, and
has returned for various lengths of time every year since. Everett started out as a
missionary with the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) and subsequently received his
PhD atthe Universidade Sao Paulo in Sao Paulo, Brazil. For years SIL missionaries who
had come before Everett tried to learnPirahii. but continuously failed. Prior to Everett's
arrival, missionaries Steve Sheldon and Arlo Heinlich lived and worked with the Pirahii.
and provided some research and notes on Pirahii. grammar that aided Everett as he learned
the language (Everett 2008).
In the wake of the controversy following Everett's 2005 article "Cultural
Constraints on Pirahii. Grammar and Cognition," linguist Tecumseh Fitch visited the
Pirahii. to investigate Everett's claims concerning recursion, but since he apparently could
not communicate adequately with the Pirahii., his research was thwarted (Colapinto 2007:
2). Psychologist Peter Gordon conducted a study on Pirahii. number and cognition in
2004 that provided important insights about the Pirahas' perception of quantities. Everett
recently replicated this study under better-controlled conditions with the help of cognitive
sciences professors Michael C. Frank, Evelina Fedorenko and Edward Gibson from MIT
(2008). Brazilian anthropologist Marco Antonio Gonyalves spent around 18 months over
a period of several years living with the Pirahii. and writing two books about Pirahii.
culture, and apparently accepts Everett's claims about culture and Pirahii. granunar
(Everett 2005, reply to comments: 642). Despite the efforts of other linguists to check

7

Everett's claims, however, no other linguist or non-Piraha besides Everett has been able
to achieve fluency in Piraha (Everett 2008).
While learning and developing a system of documentation for Piraha language,
Everett was forced to use a monolingual method of data collection. Because the Piraha
are monolingual, there was no shared language in which to converse and translate words.
Everett's method can be described as pointing, asking for words in Piraha, writing down
whatever response the native speaker gives (hoping it is correct), and immediately
practicing the word in new contexts with other speakers. This is a way of checking a
translation and expanding upon the defInition of a word and its concept. Everett studied
different "semantic fIelds" or groupings of related terms, transcribed words phonetically
on index cards, recorded the context around the word and his guess as to its likely
meaning. He worked these words into conversation with the Pirahas and determined
which sounds or phonemes were meaningful and perceptible to them, in order to devise a
writing system. Everett essentially became fluent in Piraha by a long process of trial and
error and drawing associations between a particular phoneme and many meanings.

ORlGINS
Piraha is a language isolate, meaning it shows no genetic relationship with any
other language family or language currently spoken in the world (Everett 2008: 29).
Brazilian indigenous languages are genetically diverse, with four major stocks and a few
language isolates. A proto language, the language from which a genetic grouping of
languages is descended, can be evidenced by consistent phonetic groupings and
relationships shown by cognates, or words in different languages that are recognizably

related to each other (Malmkjrer 1991: 193, 209). Pirahii has been demonstrated as
previously belonging to the Mura-Pirahii language family, for it showed clear evidence of
similarities with the now extinct Mura language. Because Mura is extinct, Piraha is
considered a language isolate, with no relation to other extant languages (Everett 2005:
622). Although many language isolates are also considered endangered, Pirahii is not
considered an . endangered language for this reason alone, because it is used so vigorously
in a monolingual environment. According to Everett, the Pirahii have no desire to learn
another language and are therefore capable of effectively preserving their language as
long as the population lives (Everett 2008: 276). However, because the population of
Pirahii speakers is so small, estimated to be currently about 250-380 (Nevins, Pesetsky,
Rodrigues 2007), Pirahii can be considered an endangered language in the sense that the
population itself is endangered (Everett 2008: 276).
There are different theories on the origins of the indigenous peoples of Latin
America and specifically in the Amazon. Archaeologist Betty Meggers believes that
Amazon was always the home of small bands of hunter-gatherers because the agricultural
potential of the Amazon's soil was too low to sustain large civilizations, at least for
prehistoric technology (Everett 2008: 28). Linguist Joseph Greenberg believes there were
three waves of migration across the Bering Strait. According to his theory, the first group
were "pushed" southward by the second group about 11,000 years ago, who were then
forced to the south by the final group, the Inuit. The first group settled South America,
and were mainly hunter-gatherers. Greenberg'S evidence can be found in the relationships
among both living and extinct languages of the Americas. He claims that the languages
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south of Mexico are more closely related than those of central and northern North
America.
According to Greenberg, Piraha should be more closely related to South
American languages, and he proposes that it is related to the Macro-Chibcha language.
Everett contends that this claim is nearly impossible to evaluate, and his evidence points
to the formation of both Pirahii and the now-extinct Mura dialect as a single language
isolate. "However," Everett says, "It is impossible to prove that Pirahii was not related to
any other Amazonian languages [besides Mura] in the distant past. Historical linguistics
methods ... simply do not allow us to look back far enough to say certainly that two
languages never developed from a common source language" (Everett 2008: 28).
Charles Mann, an American journalist and author, wrote a book called 1491:
New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus, in which he argued that indigenous
people of the Americas were larger in number, had arrived earlier (and not only by the
Bering land bridge), were more sophisticated culturally, and controlle.d the natural
landscape to a greater degree than was previously thought. He points to evidence from
the last few decades showing that indigenous populations of the pre-Columbian era set
parts of the Amazonian rainforest on fire to keep clear of unwanted trees and
undergrowth, for the sake of agriculture. Over centuries, this burning created an intricate
ecosystem of fire-adapted plant species dependent on this burning (and forest burning is
still practiced by the current inhabitants of the Beni-Bolivian providence). Mann's
argument indicates a new perspective on Amazonian indigenous populations as peoples
who control the land, instead of passively living among nature. He supports an image of
them as sophisticated, advanced cultUres since before European colonization, and also
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projects an image of the Amazon as a sustainable place for complex societies to live and
grow in. (Everett 2008: 29)
A pertinent question to Everett's study of the Piraha is, where did they come
from? Everett says, "The existence of language isolates like Piraha and Mura ... might be
understood as supporting Roosevelt's ideas, because large amounts of time are required
to sufficiently 'erase' the similarity between languages to produce a language isolate"
(Everett 2008: 29). However, he suggests that the Pirahas' extremely early isolation
during the peopling of the Americas could also explain the l~guage's isolation, by either.
the Roosevelt or Meggers theories. Everett concludes that we might never know where
the Pirahas or their language came from, as there is no oral history and no documentation
before the time of European colonialism in 1500 (unlessearlier documentation can be
found).
Some evidence suggests that the Piraha are not originally from the part ofthe
jungle where they currently live, including the lack of native vocabulary for some species
of monkeys found near the Maici river. Loan words, including the monkey paguacu,
come from the Tupi-Guarani language family. "Since there is no evidence that the
Pirahas have ever given up one of their own words in order to borrow a word from
another language, this suggests that the language had no word for this species of monkey
because it wasn't found in their [previous] homeland" (Everett 2008: 29). Everett also
mentions that all Piraha pronouns "were borrowed recently from a Tupi-Guarani
language," although he argues that the role of pronouns in Piraha is "reduced" relative to
other languages (Everett 2005: 628).

11

Upon the European arrival to the Amawn c. 1500 A.D., diseases such as
influenza, smallpox, measles and others were introduced to native groups, reducing their
populations dramatically. Europeans enslaved the natives and forced them to live on
sugar cane plantations, and many natives fled coastal areas and moved to distant,
inaccessible parts of the country such as the Amazon basin. During the 16th through 18th
centuries, the Portuguese engaged in devastating, Indian-hunting bandeiras, which were
slave raids or expeditions (Everett 2008, Roosevelt 1994: 9). As a result, indigenous
peoples are now a small percentage of the population and the largest numbers of natives
live in the north, forming around 230 different cultural groups (Encyclopedia Britannica).
Anna Roosevelt believes that the Amazon was and is capable of sustaining large
settlements and civilization. She believes that homo sapiens has been in South America
much longer than Greenberg and Meggers suggest (Everett 2008:29). She also writes
about the dramatic transformation that took place in indigenous societies during the
colonization of Amazonia. "Many groups had to adapt to greatly changed circumstances,
disappeared, and new ones came into being .... the invasions
some forms of society
I
. spelled immediate decline for some groups ... complex indigenous social forms
disappeared as the colonization expanded," (Roosevelt 1994: xiv). According to author
Antonio Porro, "over time, paramount leaders disappeared, their realms disintegrated, and
the size and number of native settlements shrank substantially as the conquest of
Amazonia progressed," (Roosevelt 1994: xiv). Historical evidence for the maltreatment
and forced relocation of indigenous peoples of the Amazon might provide a possible
explanation for the severe geographic isolation of groups such as the Pirah1l, as well as
the Pirah1l's alleged cultural and linguistic isolation.
!

.

PlRAliA LANGUAGE
According to Dan Everett, Pirah1l language has many unusual features. Among
these features, Everett contends that Pirah1l lacks terms for numbers, quantifiers, basic
color terms and embedding/recursion, that Pirah1l culture possesses a simple kinship
system, no creation myths, fiction, or collective memory, very little art.and material
culture, and is persistently monolingual despite regular long term contact with foreign
languages. Everett posits that one cultural principle can explain all of these linguistic
features as well as many Pirah1l cultural practices, beliefs and attitudes. He calls this
principle the "immediacy of experience principle," which can be defined as the constraint
of communication to "nonabstract subjects which fall within the immediate experience of
interlocutors" (Everett 20'0'5: 621). In other words, according to Everett, Piraha language
lacks terms that do not relate directly to experience that is considered relevant to Pirah1l
culture in the present, and thus excludes abstract concepts and words or linguistic systems
that are related to abstract concepts. Throughout this section on Pirah1l language and
culture I will present Everett's examples of how the inunediacy of experience principle
(lEP) allegedly operates in the Pirah1ls' lives and speech.
In order to understand the. limitations on conceptual thought that the Pirah1l
language is said. to exhibit, we must first examine some of the basic structures of Pirah1l.
According to Everett's reports, Pirah1l's phonemic inventory, or number of speech
sounds, is particularly small in proportion to most other languages. Pirah1l has only II
phonemes: eight consonants and three vowels. Because of its limited number of
phonemes, words in Pirah1l must be longer than words in a language with more speech
sounds (Everett 20'0'8: 21) and more modes of communication must be employed in order

to differentiate between words. For example, Pirab1l is a tonal language, meaning that
phonemes are given relative pitches that help defme each phoneme in context.
The writing system that Everett created to document Pirab1l includes symbols for
two relative pitches, where an accent over a vowel denotes a high tone, and lack of an
accent implies a low tone. The fact that pitches are relative means that they are not fixed
at a particular consistent pitch. Rather, pitches are vocalized lower or higher relative to
the tone that one begins with. The tonal nature of Pirab1l language, combined with its
small phonemic inventory, allows for a fascinating capability: Pirab1l speakers can
communicate using speech sounds, but also by humming, yelling, singing, o~ whistling
tones. (Everett 2008: 182).
I saw that Pirab1l allows an astonishing range of variation among consonants ...
Pirab1l makes such extensive use of tone, accent, and the weight of its syllables
that the language can be whistled, hummed, yelled, or sung. For example, the
sentence Kaixihi xaoxaaga, gaihi (There is a paca there) has a musical form. It is
this musical form that is whistled or hummed or sung [Everett 2008: 182].
Everett proceeds to describe his method of documenting this tonality using
musical notation (e.g. whole notes, quarter notes, dotted quarter notes, etc.). He states
that Pirab1l has five syllable lengths and two possible tones (one higher, one lower).
Everett attributes each of the aforementioned five channels of discourse with a unique
cultural function in Pirab1l society (Everett 2008: 185). For example, "hum speech" can
be used to disguise what one is saying or to have a private conversation. "Yell speech,"
which has only vowels and no consonants, is used to speak loudly and at long distances,
or over rain and thunder. "Musical speech" is used to communicate new information and
to communicate with spirits, often employed by "spirits" themselves (to be discussed in
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the section on Piraha culture). "Whistle speech" is used for hunting purposes, to disguise
men as part ofthe enviromnent, and in aggressive play among boys (Everett 2008: 187).
Although Piraha language can be used to communicate over a wide variety of
mediums, the language is said to employ only three forms of sentences, which are
questions, declarations, or commands. Everett claims that phatic communication (a term
coined by Malinowsky), which refers to language used for general social interaction
rather than to convey specific meaning, does not exist in Pirahii (Everett 2008: II).
Phatic communication includes terms such as "hello," "goodbye," and "Nice morning,
isn't itT' which are designed for social purposes, such as politeness and the avoidance of
awkwardness, and not to convey literal messages. Piraha does not employ this type of
communication (Everett 2008: J 1). In Everett's book on the Pirahii (2008), however, I
did observe many instances in which Everett's English translations ofPiraha sound like
phatic communication. For example, Everett relays an anecdote in which a Piraha says
"Hey Dan" to Everett (Everett 2008: 66). Upon reading this, I assumed that the
translation was purposefully changed by Everett in an effort to make the dialogue more
"readable" to English-speaking audiences. However, Everett's critics often point to
inconsistencies like this in order to question Everett's claims (see Discussion).

COLOR TERMS
Everett contends that Piraha lacks basic color terms and uses only descriptive
phrases. These phrases liken an object to another object of similar color or describe an
aspect ofthe object which would explain its coloration. As defined by Berlin & Kay
(1991), "basic color terms" express colors as abstract entities without the use of other
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terms or similes, and in their most basic form. Terms such as "crimson," "lemoncolored," or "the color of the rust on my aunt's old Chevrolet" would not be considered
basic color terms, but similes or variations of a basic color term (Berlin & Kay 1991: 5).
Everett has found no evidence of basic color terms in Pirahii. Rather, he has heard
descriptive phrases such as "that is like blood," for the color red, "it is temporarily
immature," for green, "blood is dirty," for black, and "it is transparent," for white
(Everett 2008: 21). These expressions seem to be based on the context of the color or the
material that houses the color, rather than any abstract concept of a color on its own. In
other words, Pirahii color expressions seem to be used "as modifiers and predicates but
not as substantives," (Kay 2005: 636).

NUMBERS & QUANTIFIERS
The absence of Pirahii numbers and quantifiers has also drawn significant interest
from linguists (Gordon 2004; Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, Gibson, 2008). Everett posits
that Pirahii has no granrmatical number, counting terms, or quantifiers and that it only has
terms for relative quantities (Everett 1983, 1986,2005; Corbett 2000). In addition, the
Pirahii are said not to use any external objects, fingers or body parts are used to count or
tally. This is because, according to Everett, exact quantity does not exist in Pirahii.
Rather, quantities are expressed by relative volume of an object: ''two small fish and one
medium-size fish are roughly equal in volume, but both would be less than, and thus
trigger a different "number," than a large fish" (Everett 2008: 117).
Despite the fact that ordinal numbers apparently do not exist in Pirahii and are not
counted using body parts or objects, body parts are sometimes used by the Pirahii to
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describe the order of events in time. For example, the sentence "r was born fIrst then my
sibling was born" would be literally expressed in Piraha as "r head fall sibling to me/there
at fall," employing "head" to mean "fIrst" in reference to "something at the beginning of
a spatial or temporal sequence" (Everett 2005: 624). Everett has also said that Piraha
lacks comparatives, such as phrases like "this is big/that is bigger" (Everett 2008: 21).
QuantifIers, such as all, each, and every are also allegedly lacking in Piraha. The
closest expression to these quantifIers that Piraha displays is variations on the morpheme
"big." According to Everett, too express the sentence, "we ate most of the fIsh" in
Pirahfi, one would literally say, "My bigness ate [at] a bigness offIsh, nevertheless there
was a smallness we did not eat," (Everett 2008: 120). It seems as though the Piraha use
variations of "big" and "small" in a wide array of contexts in place of quantifIers. Thus,
quantities are expressed vaguely or loosely, without exactitude.
Everett explains the difference between Pirahfi quantifIers and those in English
and other languages with the fact that the "truth conditions" of the quantifIers are
different between the languages. Truth conditions are "the circumstances under which
speakers will admit that a word is used correctly or not," and in languages such as
English, quantifIers have strict truth conditions (Everett 2008: 121). Examples that
Everett uses are the quantifIers "all" and "whole." To English speakers, these terms imply.
a complete quantity, or 100% of something, whereas Everett asserts that in Piraha,
completeness is not measured or expressed in language. "The point is that the truth
conditions in Piraha never include the precise, quantifIerlike meaning of all (where all
means "every single entity in a set") for any word in their language," (Everett 2008: 121).
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When trading with river traders, Everett says, the Piraha will point to an item or
group of items that they want, and then point to an item or group of items that they will
trade for it. There is never any measuring of quantity to ensure fair trade, and according
to Everett, the Pirahas often allow unfair trades as a result (Everett 2008). The
consequences of not having exact quantity and numbers in Piraha is that the Piraha
cannot maximize profit in an economic system.
In one anecdote, Everett relays a dialogue taking place during the sale of an

anaconda skin. The Piraha speaker initially projects that "the foreigner will likely buy
the entire anaconda skin." The word btiaiso [entire] is used like a quantifier, which we
might interpret as "entire," "whole," or "all." After this sentence is said, a piece ofthe
snake is taken by someone. Then it is sold, and the sentence "Yes, he bought the whole
thing" is uttered by the same speaker. So the word btiaiso is used again to describe the
same anaconda with a piece missing. In English, Everett says, this would not be an
acceptable use of the term "whole." For this reason, the term btiaiso cannot be
considered the equivalent of our quantifier "whole," because its defmition has looser
truth conditions (Everett 2005: 625).
Anna Wierzbicka, who has conducted research on semantic universals (Goddard
& Wierzbicka 2002), criticizes Everett's statement on the Piraha's alleged absence of the

term "all." She claims that Everett's examples of close approximations to the quantifiers
"all" and "each" count as actual quantifiers in meaning. Her criticism centers on
Everett's interpretation of the term "big" as an alternative to quantifiers as opposed to as
a quantifier itself.
The fact that the same segment used in one syntactic frame can mean "big" and in
another "all" misleads [Everett] into thinking that there is no word for "all" in

lR

Piraha-a conclusion clearly contradicted by his own data. The concept of
polysemyl is a basic tool in semantic analysis, and rejecting it altogether leads to
ludicrous results such as the following "literal" gloss2; "My bigness ate [at] a
bigness of fish, nevertheless there was a smallness we did not eat," In using such
glosses, Everett exoticizes the language rather than identifying its genuinely
distinctive features. To say that ti 'ogi means, literally, "my bigness" (rather than
"we") is like saying that in English to understand means, literally, to stand under."
To deny that hi 'ogi means "all" is to make a similar mistake [Wierzbicka 2005;
response to Everett 2005].
Whether or not the reader interprets Everett's literal gloss as exoticizing Piraha, I
am under the impression that Everett's goal in displaying literal translations was
academic in nature. In his 2008 book on the Piraha, Don't Sleep, There Are Snakes,
Everett often uses literal gloss in order to convey the manner in which Pirahfi combines
minimal parts to form complex words. In the case criticized by Wierzbicka, I believe
Everett used literal gloss to reveal the Pirahii's lack of distinct terms that stand alone as
quantifiers, and the factthat Pirahii employs different combinations of broadly defined
morphemes, creating many meanings from a small inventory of sounds. His literal
translation of "my bigness," instead of writing the English "we," serves to show the
reader how Piraha functions from a translator's perspective. The fact that the term "big"
is used in many different contexts to stand in for the functions of both quantifiers ("all")
and pronouns ("we") shows that Pirahfi does not have a distinct terminology for those
words. However, the semantic meaning of "all" seems to be communicated effectively,
despite being composed of parts with broad meanings. Here the argument seems to lie in
the definition of a quantifier; that is, whether a quantifier must be a unique term, or
whether it can be composed of morphemes and words that have other meanings.

1 Polysemy: n. the coexistence of many possible meanings for a word or phrase. (Oxford English
Dictionary)
2 Gloss: n. a translation or explanation of a word, phrase, or passage. (Oxford English Dictionary)
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Everett tried to teach the Pirahii basic numbers, reading and writing skills with
hardly any success. His attempt to get the Pirahii to replicate plain symbols on paper
failed because, Everett says, the Pirahii rejected the entire concept of a "correct" answer.
He stipulates that perhaps they did not understand where "correct" knowledge came come
from, and therefore rejected it. "They did not care at all that their symbols were all the
same, nor that there are such things as correct and incorrect written forms. When I asked
them to draw a symbol twice, it was never replicated. They considered their writing to be
no different from the marks I made," (Everett 2008: 118).
/
Every evening for eight months we tried to teach Pirahii men and women
to count to ten in Portuguese. They wanted to learn this because they
knew that they did not understand money and wanted to be able to tell
whether they were being cheated (or so they told us) by the river traders.
After eight months of daily efforts, without ever needing to call the
Pirahiis to come for class (all meetings were started by them with much
enthusiasm), the people concluded that they could not learn this material
and classes were abandoned. Not one Pirahii learned to count to ten in
eight months. None learned to add 3+ 1 or even 1+1 [Everett 2008: 118].

From these results, Everett concludes that the Pirahii do not value knowledge
from outside of their culture, and uses this anecdote to support the immediacy of
experience principle.
In 2004 bio-behavioral scientist Peter Gordon published an article in Science using
Pirahii numbers to justifY a strong version of the Whorfian linguistic relativity hypothesis.
The premise of his argument was that the Pirahii had a "one-two-many" counting system
(Gordon 2004: 496). However, Everett later translated these same terms with more
vague definitions as, respectively, "small size or amount," "somewhat larger size or
amount," and "cause to come together/many" (Everett, 2005). Despite Gordon's
apparent error in regard to these definitions, Gordon's research set the stage for further
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research by asking whether Pirahas could conceive of larger numerosities despite their
lack of language for cardinalities.
Gordon gave the Pirahiis numerical tasks in which he asked participants to match
•

small sets of objects in various configurations. Adult Pirahfu; responded accurately with
up to 2 or three objects, but performances declined when given eight to ten items, and
dropped to zero with larger sets. A single exception to this pattern was with tasks
involving unevenly spaced objects; the Pirahfu;' performance for sets of seven to ten
items, unevenly spaced, was near perfect. Gordon hypothesizes that perhaps the spacing
allowed participants to perceive groups of items as smaller "chunks" of2 or three items,
which they could then match to corresponding groups (Science Daily: Aug. 20, 2004,
Gordon 2004).
Aside from the unevenly spaced items, Gordon's results showed that Pirahil errors
generally grew larger as the quantities increased, implying that the Piraha probably used a
strategy of approximate magnitude estimation instead of representing numbers exactly.
"Results of numerical tasks with varying cognitive demands show that numerical
cognition is clearly affected by the lack of a counting system in the language.
Performance with quantities greater than three was remarkably poor, but showed a
constant coefficient of variation, which is suggestive of an analog estimation process,"
(Gordon 2004: 496). Gordon asserted that the results of his study supported the strong
Whorfian claim that language can limit cognitive abilities (Gordon 2004: 496).
Dan Everett emulated and expanded Gordon's study with partners Michael C.
Frank, Evelina Fedorenko, and Edward Gibson, with a larger sample of 14 adult
speakers, seven male and seven female, as opposed to Gordon's small sample of four
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males. The question posed by Frank et al. was, "does speaking a language without
number words change the way speakers of that language perceive exact quantities?" In
the experiment conducted by Frank et al., spools of thread were provided in increasing
number until ten were present, and participants were asked how many spools were
present after each increase. The same elicitation was done in decreasing order. The
results revealed that only three terms in Pirah1l were used to express each of the quantities
of spools, and those terms were hoi, hoi, and baagiso.
In the increasing elicitation:
o
o
o
In the decreasing elicitation:
o
o
o

Hoi - used to describe one object
Hoi - used to describe two or more objects
Baagiso - used to describe quantities of three or more.
Hoi - used to describe quantities up to six
Hoi -quantities between four and ten
Baagiso - quantities between seven and ten

As evidenced by the difference in quantities expressed by the same term in the
increasing and decreasing elicitations, each term is shown to represent only a relative idea
of quantity, and is not defmed by fixed cardinal boundaries, or "exact quantity."
"Because each of the three words was used for a dramatically different range of values in
the ascending and the descending elicitations, these words are much more likely to be
relative or comparative terms like "few" or "fewer" than absolute terms like "one" or
even proto-numbers (numerals with approximate quantities, like "roughly one," as
suggested in Gordon, 2004)," (Frank et al. 2008: 820). Ultimately, Frank et al.
determined that no exact quantities can be found in Pirah1l:
We show that the Pirah1l have no linguistic method whatsoever for expressing exact
quantity, not even "one." Despite this lack, when retested on the matching tasks
used by Gordon, Pirah1l speakers were able to perform exact matches with large
numbers of objects perfectly but, as previously reported, they were inaccurate on

matching tasks involving memory. These results suggest that language for exact
number is a cultural invention rather than a linguistic universal, and that number
words do not change our underlying representations of number but instead are a
cognitive technology for keeping track of the cardinality of large sets across time,
space, and changes in modality [Frank et al. 2008: 819].
According to Everett, Pirahli is reported to lack singular-plural morphology,
meaning that "there is no morphological route for representing the distinction between
"one" and "many"" (Frank et al. 2008: 820). In matching tasks with large quantities, a
Pirahii might have understood what was required but not have been able to perform the
tasks accurately, indicating that number vocabulary is necessary for remembering large
quantities exactly.
To Everett, the most surprising aspect of the Frank et al. was that the Pirahiis
sometimes failed on simple one-to-one matching tasks. Everett does not think that these
errors were due to misunderstandings, because extensive demonstrations and practice
runs were conducted with subjects before each experiment (Frank et al. 2008: 821). "The
failures of the Pirahii in the one-to-one matching task also suggested a potentially deeper,
strong Whorfian claim: that without number words, human beings represent only
approximate quantities, and that only by learning number words can humans create the
concept of exact quantity: the idea that adding or subtracting even a single individual
from a set will change the quantity of that set," (Frank et. a12008: 820).
Ultimately, Frank et al. presented two Whorfian claims as possible implications for
the study. The weaker claim states that language for number allows accurate memory for
sets with exact cardinalities, and the stronger claim states that language for number
creates the concept of exact cardinality (Frank et. a12008: 820). The results of the Frank
et al. study point away from the stronger claim and provide support for the weaker,
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suggesting" a view of number words as a cognitive technology, a tool for creating mental
representations of the exact cardinalities of sets, representations that can be remembered
and communicated accurately across time, space, and changes in modality,"(Frank et al.
2008: 820). "Thus, our experiments support the hypothesis that the concept of exact
quantity is not created by language, while suggesting that the ability to remember the
cardinalities oflarge sets is enabled by learning number words" (Frank et al. 2008: 823).

RECURSION / EMBEDDING
One language feature that is allegedly absent in Pirahii, recursion, is widely
considered universal. Mark Hauser, Noam Chomsky, and Tecumseh Fitch (2002) believe
it to ,be the most important distinguishing quality between animal and human
communication.

Recur~ion

can be defined as the "embedding" of one clause inside

another in a sentence (Pinker, Jackendoff, 2005). For example, the sentence "the black
cat ate the rat in the garage" includes the clauses "the cat is black," "the cat ate the rat,"
and "this is all happening in the garage," and embeds several of those clauses inside one
another (continued in the section on language universals). Ifno recursion existed in that
sentence, each clause would have to be said separately, and one after another. Pirahii
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operates that way, according to Everett, because it lacks recursion within sentences.
While Everett contends that Pirahii speakers cannot embed clauses within clauses,
he does argue that Pirahii employs recursion on a larger scale in its narrative structures.
Instead of embedding clauses, Pirahii embeds entire sentences within a narrative. Everett
believes that recursion can exist among phrases, as opposed to only syntactically (within
sentences), and that the larger cognitive function of recursion is to organize entire ideas
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in the thought process. For this reason, Everett posits that recursion is independent of
grammar. "If recursion is not found in the grammar of all languages, but it is found in the
thought processes of all humans, then it is part of general human intelligence and not part
of a "language instinct" or "universal grammar," as Noam Chomsky has claimed."
(Everett 2008: 94).

PlRA.H.A CUL TORE
According to Everett, the Pirahii subsist on fishing, hunting, foraging, and an
agricultural method introduced by previous missionaries (the planting and tilling of
manioc, which is indigenous to the Amazon - see section on technology below). Pirahii
men hunt, but women, children, and men all forage. Importantly, the Pirahii do not
preserve food in any way except for travel, despite having the knowledge and the means
to do so:
When [Pirahiis1are about to embark for a place where they expect to encounter
Brazilians, they salt meat (if they have salt) or smoke it, to preserve it. But among
themselves they never preserve meat. I haven't seen another Amazonian group that
doesn't salt or smoke meat routinely. The Pirahiis consume everything as soon as it
is hunted or gathered. They preserve nothing for themselves (leftovers are eaten
until they are gone, even if the meat begins to turn rancid [Everett 2008: 76].
Everett also describes the eating patterns of the Pirahii as irregular, due to the fact
that they eat immediately upon obtaining food. Even if it's three am, Everett says, if a
Pirahii returns from a fishing trip, people will wake up to eat the food immediately. Some
days, he says, Pirahiis will miss a meal or not eat at all. Everett claims to have once
witnessed Pirahiis dance for thee days with only brief breaks, during which no hunting,
fishing, or gathering took place . .In Everett's eyes, this attitude towards subsistence,
including rejection of food preservation, indicates a lack of worry about the future and a

clear focus on the present. Everett uses this as an example to support his "immediacy of
experience principle."
According to Everett, Pirahll sleeping patterns show the same irregularity. Everett
describes an average of four hours of sleep per night for Pirahlls, with naps that range
from 15 minutes to 2 hours at other times. Fishing takes place at all hours of the night,
which is why the Pirahas eat at whatever hour the fish is brought in (Everett 2008: 77).
Everett also writes that there is loud talking in the village throughout the entire night,
with no apparent division between daytime and nighttime activity. His primary
explanation for this behavior is the necessity for the Pirahll to be constantly aware of
dangers and predators of the jungle, particularly at night. As Everett understands it, the
advantage seems to be that someone is always awake to defend a sleeping person from
predators. Hence the title of Everett's recent book about the Pirahll, "Don't Sleep, There
Are Snakes." Everett draws an analogy between the use of this expression and our "good
night," but also maintains that the Pirahll expression is entirely literal as a warning.
Everett also uses the Pirahll attitude towards sleep to support his concept of the
immediacy of experience principle, asserting that the desire to be constantly awake
indicates a desire to live in the here and now.
Boundaries of sex and marriage in Pirahll are also loose compared to many other
cultures, by Everett's reports. Pirahll marriage is recognized simply by cohabitation, with
no ritual and very few marital restrictions. Although "married" Pirahll couples are
usually monogamous, sex is not limited to spouses. While having sex with someone
else's spouse is frowned upon, it still happens, and frequently, according to
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couple will go away for a few days, say, a married person and someone other than his or
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her spouse, and if they return remaining together, the old couple is divorced and new
couple is married, as recognized by cohabitation. While the old spouse might bemoan the
absence of his or her spouse during the days that the spouse is off somewhere, no further
mention or complaint takes place after the "divorce" (Everett 2008: 86).
The kinship vocabulary in Pirahli is relatively limited, and of the kinship terms that
do exist, many of them have broad definitions and connotations. Everett defmes Pirahli
kinship terms as such: Baixi (gender neutral) can mean any number of authority figures,
including elder, parent, grandparent, or just someone that you want something from. It is
a general sign of respect. Xahaigi (gender neutral) can refer either to a sibling, or any
Pirahli of the same generation, or to any Pirahli in the context of differentiation from
foreigners (which reminds me ofthe term "brother" in English as an inclusive symbol of
solidarity). Everett says that this term expresses a value of community, and is both
genderless and numberless. Hoagi or hoisai means "son," which literally means "to
come" or "the one that came." Kai means daughter, and Piihi means "child with at least
one deceased parent," "stepchild," and "favorite child," (Everett 2008: 86-87)
A common belief among anthropologists is that the more complex a kinship system
is, the more restrictions exist on whom to marry. Inversely, "the fewer the number of
kinship terms, the smaller the number of kinship-related restrictions there will be in a
society... Since [the Pirahli] lack any word for cousin, unsurprisingly there is no
restriction against marrying a cousin. And because xahaigi is ambiguous, I have seen
men marry their half sisters," (Everett 2008: 87). An incest taboo among the Pirahli only
prohibits the marriage of full siblings or grandparent/parent and child, and according to
Everett, hardly any other sexual rules exist among the Pirahli. Sex is not prohibited

between children and adults as long as the children are not forced or hurt (Everett 2008:
103).
Pirahli parenting could also be considered "loose" by American standards. Pirahli
children "come up" rather than being "brought up," a distinction often made between
U.S. southern and northern parenting strategies, reflected in the different expressions
used to describe the process of growing up. For one, Pirahlis do not talk baby talk.
"Children are just human beings in Pirahli society, as worthy of respect as any fully
grown human adult. They are not seen as in need of coddling or special protections,"
(Everett 2008: 89). Pirahli children are allowed to drink liquor with adults, get drunk, and
smoke tobacco. Parents do not always protect their children from harm, because they
prefer to let them learn from personal experience. For example adults will allow very
young children to play with knives or wander close to a fire, and if a child gets hurt,
hislher parent will scold himlher. Everett explains this behavior as a form of parental
Darwinism. "The Pirahlis have an undercurrent of Darwinism running through their
parenting philosophy. This style of parenting has the results of producing very tough and
resilient adults ... citizens of the Pirahli nation know that each day's survival depends on
their individual skills and hardiness," (Everett 2008: 90).
Perhaps one of the elements of Pirahli culture that can best fit into Everett's
immediacy of experience principle is the Pirahlis' lack of oral history. Everett's reports
show that the Pirahii have no stories about the past and no creation myth. When asked
about creation myths, Pirahiis will sometimes mention Brazilian or Tupi legends, but "do
not "use" them to discuss or explain anything in the world around them or the ancient
world," (Everett 2005: 633). They possess no indigenous creation myth nor any fiction

whatsoever, and when pressed about creation, the Pirahii say '''Everything is the same,'
meaning that nothing changes, nothing was created," (Everett 2005: 633). To Everett,
this indicates an acceptance of life as it is, and a lack of concern for the answers to the
ontological questions that most other cultures anguish over. Everett describes his effect
as a missionary on the Pirahii:
When I began to tell them the stories from the Bible, they didn't have much of an
impact. I wondered, was I telling the story incorrectly? Finally one Pirahii asked
me one day, well, what color is Jesus? How tall is he? When did he tell you
these things? And I said, well, you know, I've never seen him, I don't know what
color he was, I don't know how tall he was. Well, if you have never seen him,
why are you telling us this [Everett 2007b J?

Everett treats the Pirahii's immediacy of experience principle as a psychological
mechanism that serves the same function as religion and philosophy. To Everett, the
principle seems to enforce the "there is no answer" answer to ontological questions
effectively, while dispelling any reason for asking ontological questions in the first place.
It should be noted that, after Everett's 30 years with the Pirah1i, Everett was converted

from a devout Christian missionary to an atheist. Despite the fact that this change broke
up Everett's family, Everett expresses a deeper contentment with the views of atheism he
adopted, which seem inspired by the Pirahiis' cultural values. He approaches idealizing
the Pirahii as he says·, "I would go so far as to suggest that the Pirahiis are happier, fitter,
and better adjusted to their environment than any Christian or other religious person I
have ever known," (Everett 2008: 297).
Another element of Pirahii culture that Everett uses to illustrate the immediacy of
experience principle is the Pirahiis' minimal material possessions and lack of permanent
material culture, or things that last a lifetime (Everett 2008: 73-4). According to
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Everett's reports, the Pirahii have no permanent housing structures. Both types of
shelters created by the Pirahii blow over in storms, and Everett did not observe any effort
to build stronger constructions that would last longer. Hand-made tools include large,
powerful bows and arrows that take three days to make, for which each arrow takes
approximately three hours. If a basket is needed, it is woven on the spot from wet palm
leaves. Everett argues that, ""using the same skills they already demonstrated in making
these disposable baskets, they could make longer-lasting baskets, simply by selecting
more durable material (such as wicker). But they don't, I concluded, because they don't
want them ... It indicates an interest in making things as you go," (Everett 2008: 72).
In terms of art, in all of his studies; Everett could not fmd anything long lasting or

permanent created by the Pirahii. Women and babies of both genders wear necklaces
made by the women, designed both to ward of spirits and to look attractive, according to
Everett. The necklaces are created from seeds and homespun cotton string, teeth,
feathers, beads, and other objects, but "rarely show symmetry" and Everett calls them
"crude and unattractive compared to the artifacts of other groups in the region," (Everett
2008: 74). Where Everett uses the subjective term "unattractive," I would probably use
the term unconventional; completely unrelated to established art forms, common
aesthetics or tradition, and totally original. Pirahii "art" may seem "unattractive" to
someone who enjoys established tradition in art, but enjoyable to someone else who
values spontaneous expression and unlearned art forms such as folk art. However, I think
Everett's main point in calling Pirahii designs "unattractive" was to convey the fact that
Pirahiis do not pass on cultural methods of design or information that would allow
. traditions to develop in a formulaic way across generations. TIlls is a prime example of
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how Everett's writing style is often shocking or exaggerated, and can either delegitimize
his ideas or frame his intentions with negativity.
The only other example of indigenous Pirahii art that I found was in John
Colapinto's article from The New Yorker. Colapinto witnessed a child with a toy plane
created out of balsawood, modeled off of the plane that had brought Colapinto to the
Maici River. Here is his description:
I had my own doubts about Everett's portrayal of the Pirahii shortly after I arrived in
the village. We were still unpacking when a Pirahii boy, who appeared to be about
eleven years old, ran out from the trees beside the river. Grinning, he showed off a
surprisingly accurate replica of the floatplane we had just landed in. Carved from
balsa wood, the model was four feet long and had a tapering fuselage, wings, and
pontoons, as well as propellers, which were affixed with small pieces of wire so
that the boy couId spin the blades with his finger. I asked Everett whether the model
contradicted his claim that the Pirahii do not make art. Everett barely glanced up.
"They make them every time a plane arrives," he said. "They don't keep them
around when there aren't any planes. It's a chain reaction, and someone else will do
it, but then eventually it will peter out." Sure enough, I later saw the model lying
broken and dirty in the weeds beside the river. No one made another one during the
six days I spent in the village [Colapinto 2007: 2].
Throughout Everett's accounts, Everett reiterates the Pirah1ls' perceived
carelessness with material objects, both with objects made by Pirahiis and those obtained
by trade with Brazilian riverboat traders.
An interesting case that Everett uses to validate his immediacy of experience

principle is the case of Pirahii canoes. Although Pirahiis can paddle across the river on'
long strips of tree bark, they prefer to steal or trade for sturdier dugout and board canoes
made by Brazilians. Despite the fact that the Pirahii depend on these sturdier canoes for
fishing, transportation and recreation on the river, they do not build canoes. Everett hired
a Brazilian canoe builder to teach the Pirahii how to build the Brazilian dugout canoes
that they depend on:
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When he arrived, the Pirahi'is all gathered (enthusiastically) to learn from him. As
per our agreement, Simpricio let the Pirahfls do the labor, supervising rather than
building the canoe directly and instructing them carefully as they worked. After
about five days of intense effort, they made a beautiful dugout canoe and showed
it off proudly to me. I bought the tools for them to make more. Then a few days
after Simpricio left, the Pirahfls asked me for another [Brazilian] canoe. I told
them that they could make their own now. They said, "Pirahi'is don't make
canoes" and walked away. No Pirahfl has ever made another xagaoa to my
knowledge. This taught me that Pirahas don't import foreign knowledge or adopt
foreign work habits easily, if at all, not matter how useful one might think that the
knowledge is to them [Everett 2008: 76].
The Pirahfl also rely on imported tools such as machetes for butchering, building,
making bows and arrows, and digging manioc out of the ground. The only way to
acquire these types of goods is by trading jungle produce for tools with riverboat traders.
Only a few villages are able to do this, according to proximity, and tools make their way
down the river as other Pirahfl groups trade with those villages. "In spite of how
important these tools are to them, the Pirahfls do not take good care of them. Children
throw new tools in the river; people leave the tools in the fields; and often they trade tools
away for manioc meal when outsiders make their way in." To Everett, this behavior
seems to indicate that "lack of concern for the future [is] a cultural value," and that the
Pirahii "invest no more effort in something than is necessary for minimal function." He
adds that it "certainly wasn't laziness, because the Pirahas work very hard" (Everett
2008: 78-79).
According to Everett, the Pirahfls have shown no improvement in technology over
time (Everett 2008: 79). "Evidence from records of the Mura and Pirahfl for nearly three
hundred years since contact was first made in 1714 strongly supports the conclusion that
Pirahfl culture has changed little since contact with Europeans" (Everett 2008: 80). One
possible explanation for the Pirahiis' lack of progress in technology could be that they
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adopted a policy of isolationism as a result of the trauma of contact with European
colonialists in the eighteenth century. In many cases, the trauma of the colonial period
led to the cultural disintegration of indigenous groups, including the loss of knowledge
and cultnral specializations (Everett 2008: 80). Everett leans toward the conclusion that
the Pirahll became an isolationist community as a result of this trauma, rejecting the
adoption of most foreign customs, language, material goods, and generally, foreign
knowledge. When the Pirahll ask Everett about where he comes from, Everett says, it's
largely for entertainment value, and not to gain new information.
The Pirahll do not have many observable forms of ritual, according to Everett.
Although the Pirahll do bury their deceased, the tradition surrounding the burial is never
consistent, but rather, loose and variable. The dead are most often placed in a sitting
position with their limited belongings placed beside them (never more than a dozen), with
green sticks crisscrossed above the body, which is then wedged into a hole over which
broad leaves are placed. Everett interprets the burials not as ritualistic but as a practical
solution to the "indelicacy" ofleaving the corpse to decompose above ground (Everett
2008: 81-82).
The Pirahll frequently report spirits that are embodied by either members of the
community or elements of the environment such as animals or trees. Each spirit has a
name and personality, and their behavior is predictable. When a member of the
community acts out a spirit, he or she embodies this personality. The spirits only recount
first-hand stories or eye-witnessed experiences, and never speak abstractly. However,
they do give advice, such as not to fish in a certain place, and what to avoid.

The spirits appear in dances, in which a man playing the role of a spirit claims to
have encountered and been possessed by that spirit. Dances use no musical instruments,
but often involve singing, clapping and stomping. According to Everett, the dances bring
the village together, and are marked by promiscuity and merriment. Everett calls the
dances a "weak form of ritual," because the spirits are witnessed and imitated, and have
value and meaning to the community, but are not consistent or formulaic. According to
Everett, spiritual encounters and dances are intended to teach Pirahas to be strong or to
know their environment, but entirely through first-hand accounts that describe events
within inunediate experience.
The relative lack of ritual among the Pirahiis is predicted by the immediacy of
experience principle. This principle states that formulaic language and actions
(rituals) that involve reference to nonwitnessed events are avoided. So a ritual
where the principal character could not claim to have seen what he or she was
enacting would be prohibited ... the idea behind the principle is that the Pirahiis
avoid formulaic encodings of values and instead transmit values and information
via actions and words that are original in composition with the person acting or
speaking, that have been witnessed by this person, or have been told to this person
by a witness. So traditional oral literature and rituals have no place [Everett 2008:
84].
Everett reports that the Pirahii are egalitarian, the way that many American Indian
societies are by tradition (Everett 2008: 110). Social control, therefore, comes not from
coercion, but from group ostracism and spirits. Coercion, an idea emphasized by Emile
Durkheim, involves laws that coerce individuals into following conduct that is beneficial
and not harmful to society. Everett reports that he never witnessed any Pirahii exercising
authority over another, nor reprimanding another for his or her deed. Instead, Everett
asserts, social control among the Pirahii is exercised using ostracism, including exclusion
from food sharing, and the admonishments of spirits (Everett 2007b).
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Another example of the immediacy of experience principle in Pirah1i daily life is
their lack of, or very sparse material culture and lack of currency. To Everett, he fragility
and impermanence ofPirah1i housing structures indicates the absence permanent
foundation as a cultural value, and an implied belief that all things of the world are
transient. Everett posits that the Pirahii do indeed have the means to create more
permanent structures, using material and construction methods that would make houses,
canoes, or objects last longer, but that they do not seem to desire more permanent
constructions. In other words, Everett contends that the Pirah1i prefer to build houses that
blow over in a storm, and prefer to rebuild them time after time, as opposed to simply
constructing them with more sturdy materials the first time.
The canoe is one of the most puzzling examples that Everett uses to describe the
Pirah1i rejection of permanent construction. After the Pirah1i displayed competence in
building Brazilian canoes, they subsequently rejected the knowledge in favor of
purchasing Brazilian-made canoes, with the statement "Pirahiis do not make canoes."
(Everett 2008,76). With this story, Everett implies that the decision not to construct
permanent or long lasting material objects is born from a cultural value, and not any kind
of incompetence.
Upon reading this about the canoes, my question was, how do young Pirah1is
initially learn that "Pirahiis do not make canoes"? Where does the value of material
transience, or rather, the lack of value for permanent structures, come from? Everett's
theory is that this reasoning can be explained by the immediacy of experience principle,
which must be culturally learned, and that it dictates all aspects of Piraha life.

In conclusion, here is a summation of the examples Everett provides throughout
his ethnographic descriptions that are used to demonstrate his concept of the immediacy
of experience principle:
Pirahiis do not store food but eat it immediately after it is gathetedor hunted,
regardless of the time of day. Time itself seems relatively unquantified, daily activities do
not seem necessarily structured around the time of day, according to Everett's description
of Pirahii hunting and sleeping habits. Pirahiis do not sleep for the entire night, and
sometimes miss meals. Similar to the canoe story, baskets are weaved on the spot when
needed. Art is destroyed after short usage, despite how difficult it might have been to
create or obtain the art. Personal possessions are very few. Marriage is flexible. The
rules about sex in the community are few. Kinship terms have multiple meanings and
interpretations. Pirahii society is reportedly egalitarian, leaving no opportunity for social
hierarchy, dominance, power, or wealth. Everett's portrayal provides the impression that
each individual in the Pirahii community sees him or herself as an inevitably transient
entity, and that this self concept is not negative, but accepted as neutral.
Understanding how Everett connects these cultural patterns to his "immediacy of
experience principle," provides important insight into Everett's theory about the alleged
"gaps" in Pirahii language. Given the cultural values and practices discussed above,
Everett believes that Pirahii is "constrained" by the same cultural principles, necessarily
excluding ways of speaking that do not conform to those principles.

II. Language Universals
"Over all, the study a/language universals aims to establish limits an variation
within human language." (Malkmkjrer 1991 quoting Comrie 1989: 33-4)

CHOMSKY, UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR, & RECURSION
Two main approaches have been taken to study language universals, which can be
seen in the work of Joseph Greenberg and Noam Chomsky. In the study oflanguage,
linguists differentiate between I-language and E-Ianguage. I-language can be defmed as
"internalized knowledge incorporated in the brain of a particular speaker," and Elanguage as "language viewed as a shared social phenomenon external to the mind,"
(Collinge 1990: 307). Noam Chomsky focuses on I-language and ignores E-language,
establishing universals "on the basis of careful, detailed analysis of one or a small
number oflanguages," (Malkmkjrer 1991: 278). Rather than taking a large sample from a
number of languages, Chomsky used his native language, English, to generalized about
the biological functions behind the grammar of all languages.
The Chomskian approach to universals is one of nativism, biology, and genetics.
Chomsky'S groundbreaking work on universal grammar, Syntactic Structures, was fIrst
published in 1959. In it Chomsky detailed his emerging concept of generative grammar,
a set of rules that could "generate' all of the possible sentences of a language
(Ottenheimer 2006: 83). This grammar worked from the deep, abstract structures of
sentences to produce a surface structure. Chomsky's concept of "deep structure" refers to
an underlying grammar beneath the process of producing a sentence, while surface
structure referred to actual sentences produced. The rules that dictate how deep
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structures are created are called "phrase structure rules," referring to the order in which
phrases can fit with each other in a sentence, such as noun phrases, verb phrases, and
prepositional phrases.
Thus, Chomsky's concept of universal grammar can be defined as, "the surface
structure of any language is explained with reference to certain highly abstract features
which are shared by all languages because they are innate in humans," (Malkmkjrer 1991:
278). In other words, a "deep structure" can be found inherent in all languages, which
provides the fundamental biological function to create grammar out of sounds provided
by one's environment, or "stimulus." The Chomskian mindset can be described as such:
Chomskians see the study oflanguage as a means of exploring the human mind.
They explore language as a phenomenon internal to speakers, rather than as a
social phenomenon. Innateness is justified as an explanation for universals on the
grounds that the evidence children have available through the language they hear
around them is insufficient for them to develop the complex, abstract grammar
which.underlies any language [Malkmkjrer 1991: 278].
Chomsky uses human language acquisition as a means of supporting his
innateness hypothesis. "Children end up using the language correctly and creatively, that
is, they produce not only sentences which they have heard before, but also new sentences
which, once the acquisition process is complete, are invariably grammatical,"
(Malkmkjrer 1991: 278). Chomsky reasons that if humans were not innately structured to
produce only grammatical sentences, they might produce new sentences that were
ungrammatical. But children consistently produce grammatical sentences that they have
never heard before. Even children who are still in the process oflearning language
produce very few mistakes violating the principles of Universal Grammar. Because these
principles are too abstract for a small child to learn from a parent or teacher, Chomsky
reasons that these grammatical principles must be innate. (Malkmkjrer 1991: 1991)
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Among Chomsky's many critics, Geoffrey Sampson opposes Chomsky's view of
language as stemming from biology because he views language as a part of culture, or as
a "cultural institution," affected largely by environment as opposed to biology.
As previously mentioned, recursion, or embedding, is "the embedding of one
clause inside another in a sentence," (Pinker, Jackendoff2005), or "putting one phrase
inside another of the same type or lower level, e.g., noun phrases in noun phrases,
sentences in sentences, etc." (Everett 2005: 622). With the property ofrecursion in
language comes the formal property of "discrete infinity," which can be described as the
ability to embed within sentences at infinite length. Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch define
the property in this way:
The Core Property of discrete infinity is intuitively familiar to every language
user. Sentences are built up of discrete units: There are 6-word sentences and 7word sentences, but no 6.5 word sentences. There is no longest sentences( any
candidate sentence can be trumped by, for example, embedding in it "Mary thinks
that ... "), and there is no non-arbitrary upper bound to sentence length. In these
respects, language is directly analogous to the natural numbers ... At a minimum,
then, [the Faculty of Language - Narrow Sense] includes the capacity of recursion
[Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch quoted in Nevins et al. 2007: 9].
Therefore, Everett's claim that Piraha: lacks recursion implies that the inventory
of possible sentences one can create in Piraha: is finite, while most other languages that
possess recursion can create an infinite number of infrnitely long sentences.
Chomsky, Hauser, and Fitch suggest that syutactic recursion is the only aspect
that is unique to both humans and language, "the rest of language being either specific to
humans but not to language (e.g. words and concepts) or not specific to humans (e.g.
speech perception)," (pinker, Jackendoff 2005). Pinker and Jackendoff explore which
aspects of language are uniquely human and uniquely linguistic, and they conclude that
Chomsky'S hypothesis about recursion being the only such factor is problematic.
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It ignores the many aspects of grammar that are not recursive, such as phonology,
morphology, case, agreement, and many properties of words. It is inconsistent
with the anatomy and neural control of the human vocal tract. And it is weakened
by experiments suggesting that speech perception cannot be reduced to primate
audition, that word learning carmot be reduced to fact learning, and that at least
one gene involved in speech and language was evolutionarily selected in the
human lineage but is not specific to recursion [Pinker, lackendoff2005].

If Chomsky, Hauser, and Fitch suggest that syntactic recursion is the only element
that is unique to both humans and language, and Piraha does not possess syntactic
recursion, then it would follow from Chomsky, Hauser, and Fitch's hypothesis that
Pirahii is not a human language. This is one very controversial aspect of Everett's
research. First, his claim that Pirahii does not have recursion indicates an enormous
difference between the linguistic capacities of Piraha and languages with recursion. To
some readers, this might suggest that Everett sees the Pirahii as less culturally and
linguistically evolved than other cultural groups.
Brent Berlin noted that the grammatical feature of recursion has been correlated
with cultural complexity, quoting Givan's work on "pragmatic" and "syntactic"
modes of speech that "reflect changing functions of language with cultural
evolution, leading him to conclude that 'certain types oflanguages-those which
have only coordination ('clause chaining') but no subordination-are found only
in pre literate 'societies of intimates"" [Givan 1979 quoted in Berlin 2005: 635].
However, Pinker and lackendoff argue that since Pirahii has all granunatical
elements that distinguish human communication from that of auimals, it is undoubtedly a
human language, and an exception to Chomsky's rule about recursion.
Recursive possession (my father's brother's lincle), are conveyed in Pirahii by
means of monoclausal constructions connected paratactically (i.e. without
embedding). However, Pirahii very clearly has phonology, morphology, syntax,
and sentences, and is undoubtedly a human language, qualitatively different from
anything found in animals [pinker & lackendoff 16].
In the reply to Everett's 2005 article in Current Anthropology, Andrew Nevins,
David Pesetsky and Cilene Rodrigues (2007) write, "We fmd no evidence ... that Pirahii
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lacks embedded clauses, and in fact fmd stro'hg syntactic and semantic evidence in favor
of their existence in Pirab1i" (Nevins, Pesetsky, Rodrigues 2007: 1). They base most of
their claims on Everett's 1987 dissertation from the Universidade Estadual de Carnpinas
in Brazil and on the etlmographic work of Brazilian anthropologist Marco Antonio
Gons:alvez (1993; 2001). Nevins et al. claim that evidence for

~nguistic

diversity does

not disprove Chomsky's theory of universal grammar, because universal grammar is not
influenced by culture. Rather, they explain, universal grammar is a structure that is
innate to every human being, upon which a cultural environment can build any type of
language.
"Universal Grammar" is nothing more than a narne for the human capacity for
language, an aspect of our genetic endowment. The very existence oflinguistic
diversity teaches us that a given individual's personal linguistic abilities and
behaviors reflect not only UG but also that individual's linguistic experience (in
ways that UG itself circumscribes). Imagine we learn that aspects of some
individual's linguistic experience were shaped by the culture of the community in
which the individual grew up (surely a truism). In such a case, we may have
learned something interesting about linguistic experience or about culture, but we
have not necessarily learned anything about UG (much less aboutthe design
features for language) [Nevins, Pesetsky, Rodrigues 2007: 4].
Therefore, Nevins et al. consider universal grammar to be a reality regardless of
variations in the way that it is phenotypically expressed (Nevins, Pesetsky, Rodrigues
2007: 4). By this logic, recursion would exist in the brains of every individual, but would
not be expressed by the languages of some cultures. In answer to Everett's claims,
Nevins et al. seem to imply that the Pirab1i do have the capability for syntactic recursion,
but their language mayor may not utilize this capability. However, Everett seems to
want to reject the importance of syntactic recursion as a defIning feature of human
language, using the Pirab1i as an exception to disprove the rule (Everett 2005: 634).
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GREENBERG's UNIVERSALS
In the 1950's, American linguist Joseph Greenberg (1915-2001) examined a large
number of languages in wide geographic and genetic distribution and located potential
universals, as wellas many cross-linguistic tendencies. 30 languages were sampled,
including Basque,Serbian, Welsh, Norwegian, Modem Greek, Italian, Finnish,
European, Yoruba, Nubian, Swahili, Fulani, Masai, Songhai, Berber (African), Turkish,
Hebrew, Burushaski, Hindi, Kannada, Japanese, Thai, Burmese, Malay (Asian), Maori,
Loritja (Oceanic), Maya, Zapotec, Quechua, Chibcha, and Guarani (American Indian)
(Malkmkjrer 1991: 279). Mass comparative research like Greenberg's is necessarily
limited to the study oflanguages that are available to present observation (not past,
extinct languages, and not future languages). According to Greenberg, there are several
important methods for how to choose the languages to represent in a mass comparison
study. Selecting a wide range of genetic language families will dispel the idea that shared
properties are universal when related by language family. Wide geographical distribution
will avoid the possibility of influence of shared language traits due to proximity. Finally,
there should be variability in language "type," according to distinctions of language
typology (Malkmkjrer 1991: 277-284) Greenberg admits, "without much more complete
sampling of the world's languages, the absence of exceptions to most of the universals
asserted here cannot be fully assured" (Greenberg 1963).
The approach that Greenberg invented as a means of determining and defming
linguistic universals in a study is called the "implicational approach." Using this method,
each language universal is implicational by nature, implying "given x in a language, we
always find y." The implicational method is a means for testing a linguistic hypothesis
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scientifically, using an empirical approach, as opposed to one that is purely theoretical.
Using the implicational approach, Greenberg proposed 45 universals of three kinds:
word order universals, syntactic universals, and morphological universals. Of the word
order universals, Greenberg proposed a Basic Order Typology that is now widely used
by linguists to describe the relative order or the subject, object and verb in declarative
sentences of a language. Of the six possible orders, (SVO, SOY, VSO, OSV, OVS), only
three normally occur as dominant orders, VSO, SVO, and SOY, in which the verb either
comes before the subject and object, between them, or after both of them. The
implicational universal tendency Greenberg proposed, therefore, is as follows: "In
declarative sentences with nominal subject and object, the dominant order is almost
always one in which the subject precedes the object," (Greenberg 1963).
There are two types of strengths that can be attributed to language universals, which
are indicated by the terms "universal tendency" vs. "absolute universal." A universal
tendency would be determined using the implicational approach, and seen in most
languages, but not necessarily all, and is

su~ject to

exceptions. An absolute universal, on

the other hand, is seen as necessarily universal to all languages. "All languages have
vowels" is an example of an absolute universal, since no language has yet been
discovered as lacking vowels. (Malkmkjrer 1991: 282) On the other hand, "nearly all
language have nasal consonants" is an example of a non-implicational tendency, which is
stated bald-on but is acknowledged as having exceptions. The universal "all languages
have at least three persons and two numbers" is explained from the point of view of
discourse pragmatics: the necessity of having three persons in a language allows speakers
to make referential distinctions, which aids in communication. However, it should be
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noted that "it is often not possible to establish for certain whether a universal is absolute
or just a strong tendency" (Malkmkjrer 1991 :282).

HOCKETT'S DESIGN FEATURES
In 1960, American linguist Charles Hockett proposed 13 design features of human
language, which increased to 16 design features in 1968, distinguishing human language
from animal communication (Ottenheimer 2006: 177-181, 182, Hockett and Altmann,
1968). These design features are as follows:
1) Vocal auditory channels: Language can also exist in visual and written forms,
but many linguists consider sound, or voice and hearing, to be the primary means of
communication among humans. 2) Broadcast transmission and directional reception:
while the sounds of human language are sent out in all directions, listeners perceive the
sound as originating in a particular direction. 3) Rapid fading: sounds used in
communication do not last very long, or fade rapidly. 4) Interchangeability: the ability to
send and receive the same message. This also implies that any human can repeat any
sentence said by another human. 5) Total feedback: the ability to hear and internalize a
message one has sent, 6) Semanticity: speech sounds linked to specific meanings. 7)
Arbitrariness: there is no direct connection between the signal and its meaning. 8)
Discreteness: each unit of communication can be separated and unmistakable. 9)
Specialization: speech is produced only for communication, and does not serve another
function (Ottenheimer 2006: 177-181).
10) Displacement: the ability to discuss things not physically present. This
includes real things that are physically absent in the present, such as a person living on
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the other side of the world, as well as different time frames, such as the past or future.
This also includes abstract concepts and fiction. 11) Productivity: the ability to create
new messages using existing signs. This is considered a key feature of human language.
Noam Chomsky illustrated this principle with the sentence, "Colorful green ideas sleep
furiously," which exemplifies the human capability to formulate grammatical sentences
from completely original ideas that need not make sense. This ability allows us to speak
in metaphor and abstract, poetic language. The point is that human beings can create an
infinite number of sentences using a finite inventory of speech sounds (Ottenheimer
2006: 177-181).
12) Traditional transmission: the learning oflanguage occurs in social groups. l3)
Duality ofpatteming: meaning signs (words) are made from meaningless parts (sounds,
letters). 14) Prevarication: the ability to lie/make false statements. 15) Reflexiveness:
language can refer to itself. 16) Learnability: speakers of one language can learn to speak
another (Ottenheimer 2006: 177-181).
Dan Everett has claimed that the Pirahii language violates three of Hockett's
universal design features: interchangeability, displacement, and productivity (Everett
2005: 621). In regard to interchangeability, Everett reasons, "to the degree that Pirahii
lacks a concept of counting, it is incommensurate in that semantic or cognitive domain
with languages that have such a concept," (Everett 2005: 633). In other words, Everett
claims that Pirahii lacks interchangeability because it is not mutually translatable with
languages that have number and counting systems.
However, Andrew Pawley asserts that Everett has "misinterpreted" Hockett's
definition of "interchangeability." Pawley says that Everett "takes "interchangeability"
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to mean "intertranslatability"-that what can be said in one language can be said in any
other. Hockett (1958:578) defInes "interchangeability" as a relation between speakers
and hearers: any speaker of language X can understand what someone else says in X and
can say the same things," (Pawley 2005, response to Everett 2005). Pawley goes on to
say that natural languages are not usually completely mutually translatable due to cultural
differences.
Pawley also claims that Everett has misinterpreted Hockett's defInition of
"productivity," which he says Everett links to "interchangeability." Rather, Pawley says,
Hockett defInes productivity as "being able to say things that have never been said
before," (Pawley 2005, comment on Everett 2005). Finally, Pawley says that while
Pirahii speech allegedly exhibits one degree of displacement, he feels uncomfortable with
the claim that Pirahii is incapable of expressing further displacement. Pawley believes
that Pirahii has "considerable apparatus for talking about non-immediate experience but
that there is a strong cultural preference not to do so." He adds that in order to assess
claims about Pirahii using only one degree of displacement, considerable examination
would have to be done using a well-founded scale of abstractness (Pawley 2005).

BERLIN & KAY: BASIC COLOR TERMS
In 1969, Brent Berlin and Paul Kay conducted what is now a famous study of
universal color vocabulary, entitled Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and
Evolution. Their study used color vocabulary to understand the full range of meaning
that a word can embody. Some cultures include non-colorimetric information in their
color terms, and one of Berlin & Kay's goals was to discover the extent to which this
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non-colorimetric, culturally leamed information factored into the defmition of each basic
color term. In other words, they wanted to see how each culture in the study defmed and
distinguished colors from one another (Berlin & Kay 1969).
A "basic color term," as defmed by Berlin & Kay, is the simplest, most pared-down
form of word that expresses the most "basic" form of a color. In English, basic color
terms include red, orange, yellow, blue, green, and purple. A basic color term is
monolexemic, meaning it is not predictable from the meaning of its parts. Its
signification is also not included in that of any other color term, its application must not
be restricted to a narrow class of objects, and "It must be psychologically salient for
informants. Indices of psychological salience include, among others, (1) a tendency to
occur at the beginning of elicited lists of color terms, (2) stability of reference across
informants and across occasions of use, and (3) occurrence in the idiolects of all
informants," (Berlin & Kay 1969: 6).

Data was collected from 20 languages from a number of unrelated language
families, along with writing samples, which together comprised 98 diverse languages.
Participants were given a board of paint chips and asked to identify all of the chips that
fell within the range of each color term in their vocabulary. Then participants were asked
to identify a single chip as the locus of the most intensely representative hue of each
color. Surprisingly, the results found the loci to be similar cross culturally among
cultures who shared some of the same terms (Berlin & Kay 1969: 5).
Most importantly, the results of Berlin and Kay's study showed that while different
languages encode different numbers of basic color categories, "a total universal inventory
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of exactly eleven basic color tenus of any given language are always drawn," (Berlin &
Kay 1969). While some languages only have two basic color tenus, and some languages
have five, the order in which those color tenus appear is consistent across all languages.

In other words, when one color is found in a language, all of the colors preceding it in the
established order should be present also. If a culture has only two color tenus, those
terms are white and black. The order can be shown as such:

[white, black] > [red] > [green or yellow] > [yellow or green] > [blue] > [brown] > [purple, pink, orange, or gray]
[Berlin & Kay 1969].
Berlin and Kay's research "strongly indicates that semantic universals do exist in
the domain of color vocabulary." They go further to posit, "these universals appear to be
related to the historical development of all languages in a way that can be properly
tenued evolutionary," (Berlin & Kay 1969: 1) Berlin and Kay attributed this order of
color tenus to an order oflinguistic development, and to the order in which the human
eye can detect color in the electromagnetic spectrum.
As previously explained, Everett has asserted that Piraha has no basic color terms.
Instead, he contends that Pirahii expresses colors using descriptive phrases, defying a
trend that is widely considered universal. Paul Kay's response to Everett's 2005 article
on Pirahii grammar and cognition stated that "Piraha: color expressions convey immediate
sensations, not abstract concepts," and that "given the Pirahii concern with concrete,
immediate experience ... I believe that their actual presence [referring to basic color
terms1would support his broader claims regarding Piraha: predilection for immediate
experience," (Kay 2005, response to Everett 2005). Kay goes on to discuss the Pirahii
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expression for greenlblue, translating as "inunature" or "temporary," which the
missionary Steve Sheldon found to be widely shared among the Pirahli as meaning
"green-or-blue with a focus in green" (Kay 2005). He points out that it is fairly common
for languages to associate the color term for green with "unripe" or "inunature"
vegetation, and that in some cases, this shared word can also be considered a basic color
term.
Kay then makes the distinction between Sheldon's way of writing the expression
for green, as a single word, with Everett's way of writing it, as separate words. While
Sheldon viewed the expression as a basic color term, Everett interpreted the expression as
an inconsistent descriptive phrase in more than one word. He says, "my account predicts
that in Pirahii colors will be described by phrases according to each experience rather

than given variable-like names," (Everett 2005, reply to critics). Everett also brings to

our attention the fact that Pirahii color expressions often contain the word "like," creating
a simile, such as "like blood" (red), or "like water" (blue). This violates one of Berlin &
Kay's (1969) requirements for the definition of a basic color term, that "its application
must not be restricted to a narrow class of objects," such as blood or water.
In reference to the Berlin & Kay requirements that color terms must have "stability
of reference across informants and across occasions of use, and (3) occurrence in the
idiolects of all informants," (Berlin & Kay 1969), Kay points to Sheldon's research,
which had claimed that the Pirahiis agreed upon color terms. However, Kay explains that
Sheldon admitted a flaw in the study; the Pirahiis had consistently consulted among one
another before providing answers, despite being asked to complete the study individually.
Everett asserts from personal experience that Pirahiis "frequently disagree on the
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description of colors," and that "moreover, different phrases can be used by the same
speaker to describe the same color in the same situation," (Everett 2005a). Finally, both
Kay and Everett agree that Sheldon's research on color terms had poor experimental
controls, and that the experiment would need to be replicated in order to determine
whether members of the Piraha community actually agreed upon the same color
terms/expressions consistently.
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III. Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis
mSTORlCAL DEVELOPMENT
The linguistic relativity hypothesis proposes cognitive interactions between
language, thought and reality, a strong version of the hypothesis being that "certain
properties of a given language have consequences for patterns of thought about reality,"
(Lucy 294). The historical development of the hypothesis can be dated to the first
century with St. Augustine (354-430), who proposed that language is mere nomenclature
for antecedently existing concepts (Gumperz & Levinson 1996: 4). In the late 17th and
early 18th centuries, Locke, Condillac, Diderot, Hamman, and Herder furthered the
concept. Their concerns were both theoretical and methodological, investigating the
reliability of language-based knowledge in religion and science, as well as practical and
social, concerning European efforts to consolidate national identities and cope with
colonial expansion (Lucy 1997: 293).
In the 19th century, Homboldt (1767-1835) from Germany developed the related
concept of "Weltanschauung," meaning unique worldview, of each language. He used
this concept to assert the superiority of infiectionallanguages, a blatantly racist claim that
the speakers of these languages were more culturally and mentally advanced (Lucy 1997:
294). De Saussure contributed to the linguistic relativity hypothesis with early 20th
century structuralism, particularly with his concept of valeur, "wherein an expression
picks up distinctive meaning through its opposition to other expressions ... the content of
linguistic expressions depends on the system in which they are embedded." "Since no
two linguistic systems or subsystems are ever identical, ... Linguistic relativity more or
less follows" (Gurnperz & Levinson 1996: 4).
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Finally, in the early 20th century, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf emphasized
thefrrsthand study oflanguages and rejected "hierarchical, quasi-evolutionary rankings
oflanguages and cultures" (Lucy 1997: 294). Before Boas, Sapir and Whorf, there was
a marked lack of direct empirical research on the topic of language and thought. John
Lucy proposes that this was partly due to the interdisciplinary nature of the subject,
combined with increasing disciplinary specialization in the frelds of the social sciences.
Some academics also worried that accepting linguistic relativism would undermine the
conduct of the social sciences (Lucy 1997: 294). The hypothesis had the potential to
delegitimize its freId, since the question of whether each language requires 'different
thought processes also calls into question whether anthropologists of one culture can
effectively understand their subjects of other cultures (and languages). Another fear about
linguistic relativity was that it would open the door to ethical relativity, providing reasons
to excuse unethical activities by attributing them to cultural relativity. Still others
equated the entire concept oflinguistic relativity with absolute linguistic determinism, the
strongest form of the hypothesis implied by Whorf in some of his later writings (Lucy
1997: 294). Absolute linguistic determinism implied limits to freedom of thought,
framing language as a box that encloses the mind (Gumperz & Levinson 1996: 22).

APPROACHES
As previously stated, the linguistic relativity hypothesis holds that certain properties
of a given language have consequences for patterns of thought about reality. First,
"language embodies an interpretation of reality and language can influence thought about

that reality," and second, "each language involves a particular interpretation [of
experience and reality], not a cornmon universal one," (Lucy 1997: 294-5). Ibis
particular interpretation is a result of language guiding cognitive activity, as well as the
beliefs and behaviors that depend on it.
In linguist John A. Lucy's 1997 article on the linguistic relativity hypothesis, Lucy
detailed three approaches to empirical research on the hypothesis. A structure-centered
approach begins with an observed difference in the structure of meaning between
languages and tries to interpret behavior as influenced by language structure (Lucy 1997:
296). Examples of the structure-centered approach include studies of temporal marking
and number marking in language. In the 1930's, Benjamin Whorf compared Hopi &
English vocabulary for time. His argument stated that English speakers treat cycles of
time with the same grammatical framework that they treat objects. "English speakers
treat these cycles as object-like, as though they can be measured and counted just like
tangible objects that have a form and substance," while Hopi speakers treat tirnecycles as
recurrent events. While the Hopi do have terms for temporal cycles, such as days and
years, their formal grammatical structure does not allow for an "abstract" notion of time
(Lucy 1997: 296).
In 1992, John Lucy conducted a structure-centered, comparative study of the
relation between grammatical number marking and cognition among speakers of
American English and Yucatec Maya. He observed that in English, plurals are
obligatory, whereas in Yucatec, plurals are optional. The Yucatec Maya use numeral
classifiers, whlch occur in many languages, particularly East Asian languages. Lucy also
found that English speakers show preference for shape-based classifications, whereas

Yucatec speakers show preference for material-based classifications.
Domain-centered approaches, by contrast, begin with the domain of experienced
reality and seek how languages encode or construe it. Speakers of different languages are
asked to refer to "the same" materials or situations in order to assess how each language
would handle a different referential problem. The goal is for the comparison to.reveal the
distinct way in which each language functions (Lucy 1997: 298).
The study of color categories provide examples of the domain-centered approach.
Eric Lenneberg et al. (Brown & Lenneberg 1954, Lenneberg 1953, Lenneberg & Roberts
1956) showed that some colors were more codable than others in English, and later, in
Zuni. The more codable colors were recognized and remembered more readily in
nonlinguistic tasks. As previously discussed, Berlin & Kay contioued the study in 1969,
which Kay & McDaniel then continued in 1978. These studies showed that a small
number of "basic" color terms emerge in many languages and that these patterns stem
from biological sources. Such results were thought of as evidence against the linguistic
relativity hypothesis. However, Lucy posits that the studies were evidence for constraints
on linguistic diversity, and not relativity. "Addressing linguistic relativity would require
assessing the impact of differences in color term systems on cognition," (Lucy 1997:
300).
Behavior-centered approaches "begin with an encounter with a marked difference
in behavior, usually one that is initially inexplicable but which the researcher comes to
believe has its roots in a pattern of thought arising from language practices," (Lucy 1997:
301). In 1981 and 1984, Alfred Bloom conducted studies on counterfactual reasoning
between Chinese and English speakers. In 1993,1995 and 1996, Alimen and Hiltunen
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studied the effects oflanguage on occupational accidents between Swedish and Finnish
speakers. Perhaps the most famous study with a behavior-centered approach was
Wharfs 1956 well-known examples of patterns of speech contributing to accidental fires.

BOAS
Both Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf drew heavily on the work of Franz
Boas (1858-1942) and his ideas about linguistic relativity. Boas' primary concern was to
"break away from racial and evolutionary conceptions of culture" by arguing for both the
"psychic unity of mankind" and a "notion of distinct cultures and culture areas, each to be
studied on its own terms," (Lucy 1992: 11). He explains this paradox by saying that
while variations among languages reflect the divergent historical experience of the
speech commnnity, the "psychic unity of man" is reflected by universals across
languages (Lucy 1992: 14): "The occurrence of the most fundamental grammatical
concepts in all languages must be considered as proof of the unity of fundamental
psychological processes," (Boas 1966: 67 quoted in Lucy 1992: 14). Thus, language
illustrates the beauty of mankind as one biological species but many cultures and "races."
Boas presented three arguments about the nature of language. First, he said,
languages classify experience (both lexical and grammatical elements oflanguage) (Lucy
1992:12, Boas 1966). Second, different languages classify experience differently (Lucy
1992: 12). "In various cultures these classifications may be founded on fundamentally
distinct principles," (Boas 1965: 190 quoted in Lucy 1992: 12). He provided examples of
how one experience would be rendered differently between languages and how a set of
experiences would be grouped differently by various languages.

The most famous example of the different ways that language expresses experience,
provided by Boas, is of the Eskimo words for snow: "Here we find one word, aput,
expressing SNOW ON THE GROUND; another one, qana, FALLING SNOW; a third

one,piqsirpoq, DRIFTING SNOW; and a fourth one, qimuqsuq, A SNOWDRIFT,"
(Boas 1966: 21-22 quoted in Lucy 1992: 12). The fact that Eskimo languages have
completely separate terms for something that is generally expressed with one word in
English means that Eskimos think of snow in different ways than we do. By the
examples provided, we can see that the terms for "snow" are determined by the different
forms that snow can take, which may be more useful to differentiate for a population
constantly surrounded by snow. Boas asserts that the grammatical categories used in a
language are different cross-culturally, saying "Many of the categories which we are
inclined to consider as essential may be absent in foreign languages, and ... other
categories may occur as substitutes" (Boas 1966: 38 quoted in Lucy 1992: 13). Boas'
example of snow terms is one of the first influential examples of how culture and
environment affect language and thought.
Third, Boas asserted that linguistic phenomena are unconscious because oftheir
automatic production (Lucy 1992: 13). "The linguistic classifications never rise into
consciousness, while in other etImological phenomena, although the same unconscious
origin prevails, these often rise into consciousness,and thus give rise to secondary
reasoning and to re-interpretations," (Boas 1966: 63 quoted in Lucy 1992: 13).
Essentially, while language classifies experience, speakers remain unaware of this
process because of the highly automatic nature oflanguage.

SAPIR
Edward Sapir essentially "reversed Boas' claim that linguistic classifications reflect
thought and argued rather that organized linguistic classifications channel thought,"
(Lucy 1992: 19). Sapir first argued that thought arises from an interpretation oflanguage
classifications. "Thought may be defmed as the highest latent content or potential
content of speech," (Sapir 1949: 14-15 quoted in Lucy 1992: 19). Second, Sapir argued
that this process of reading into linguistic categories interacts with the "formally
complete" nature of language to create a systematic reconstitution of reality (Lucy 1992:
20).
Once abstracted from experience, [language categories] are systematically
elaborated in language and are not so much discovered in experience as imposed
upon it because of the tyrannical hold that linguistic form has upon our
orientation in the world [Sapir, 1964: 128 quoted in Lucy 1992: 20].
Essentially, Sapir asserts that we understand experience in terms oflanguage
categories which, through their abstraction, no longer correspond to experience directly
(Lucy 1992: 20).
In regard to the question of how much language influences thought and culture, as
opposed to how much thought and culture influence language, Boas leaned towards the
former as a more powerful force. "It seems very questionable in how far the restriction
of the use of certain grammatical forms can really be conceived as a hindrance in the
formulation of generalized ideas. It seems much more likely that the lack of these forms
is due to the lack of their need," (Boas 1966: 60 quoted in Lucy 1992: 14).
Boas seemed to reject the stronger version of the linguistic relativity hypothesis,
absolute linguistic determinism, which views language as a box controlling and
constraining the mind. "Presumably the language alone would not prevent a people from
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advancing to more generalized forms of thinking if the general state of their culture
should require expression of such thought," (Boas 1966: 63, 1965: 181-183 quoted in
Lucy 1992: 14). Thus, while Edward Sapir saw in language a "powerful shaping factor,"
arguing that "the use of this tool transforms and, in part, constitutes conceptual thought,"
Boas thought that language primarily reflected thought and culture, only occasionally
having direct influence on them (Lucy 1992: 23-4).

WHORF
Benjamin Lee Whorf(1897-1941) was trained as a chemical engineer at MIT, and
then worked as a fire-prevention engineer for Hartford Insurance Company. He produced
descriptive works on the modem Nahuatl (Aztec) and Hopi languages, historical
reconstructions ofDto-Aztecan and adjacent language families, epigraphic studies of
Mayan and central Mexican hieroglyphic writings, and other descriptive and theoretical
works (Lucy 1992: 25).
Following Boas, Whorfbelieved that language classifies experience, that language
classifications vary across languages, that they are out-of-awareness, and that language
classifications undeniably influence thought. Whorf showed how linguistic analogies
associated with the linguistic classifications of experience "embody conventional
compromises necessary for speech" and provide a way for different meanings to
influence one another (Lucy 1992: 62). In other words, analogies used in language to
interpret experience can sometimes allow for multiple meanings, which, when confused,
can misguide a cognitive interpretation of external reality.
This idea was drawn from Whorf's experience as a fire prevention engineer as he

investigated the way that individuals are led into fire-causing mistakes "by drawing
plausible (in the sense of grammatically founded) yet situationally inappropriate
inferences from lexemes that have multiple meanings," (Lucy 1992: 62). Whorf also
employed other examples from his comparative studies of Hopi and English to show how
speakers illustrate concepts characteristic of their cultures as they follow the implications
of their language's grammatical patterns. While Whorfs examples did not "prove" the
theory oflinguistic relativity, they showed its relevance. to our day-to-day life and
activities, and the possible consequences of the relationship between language and
thought. He also pointed the way towards further empirical study of this relationship.

EVERETT'S CONCLUSION
At the end of Everett's 2005 article, Cultural Constraints on Piraha Grammar,
Everett reveals the implications of his study for the field of linguistics. All of these
implications are based the linguistic relativity hypothesis, finding their strength in the
idea that culture and language influence one another. When Everett contends that Pirahii
language defies three of Hockett' s universal design features, he defies the idea of an
established set of universal qualities that human language can possess. He then goes on
to reason that, if he is correct about the lacking features ofPirahii grammar, then the
influence oflanguage and culture on one another is strongly evidenced, and several
implications follow:
1. If culture is causally implicated in grammatical forms, then one must learn one's
culture to learn one's grammar, but then, contra Chomsky (2002), a grammar is
not simply "grown" [Everett 2005: 633].
It is worth mentioning that Everett uses the term "learn" to refer to the process by
which individual humans develop language, while Pinker (representing Chomsky's

views) uses the term "acquire" (Pinker 1994). This difference in terminology represents
the differing viewpoints of Everett and Chomsky on the nature ofhrnnan language and
the way that hrnnan beings develop it. While Chomsky and Pinker believe that humans
acquire language via a biological mechanism that encodes language using a universal
"deep structure" in the mind, Everett believes that the "structure" oflanguage that each
hrnnan learns is more heavily dependent on the cultural environment in which that human
grows up. Hence, Everett uses the expression "learn language" to. emphasize the impact
of culture on grammatical structure and cognitive thinking, whereas Chomsky and Pinker
employ "acquire language" to downplay the influence of culture and environment on
language> and emphasize the inevitability, heredity and biological nature oflanguage
cognition.
Everett implies that ifhis claims about Pirah1i culture influencing grammar are
correct, then Chomsky's theory about how language is "acquired" is weakened. 3 He
means to say that if his study can prove that culture does indeed have an impact on
grammar, then grammar cannot be considered only biological and innate, but also subject
to cultural differences. In other words, Everett means to say that there is no universal

grammar inasmuch as there is no universal culture. Everett clearly defines language as
an aspect of culture,placing this importance over all of the genetic features of language
faculty.
The second implication for the field of linguistics that Everett writes in his 2005
article pertains directly to the linguistic relativity hypothesis:

3 (Everett uses the term "grown" interchangeably with Pinker's "acquire").
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Linguistic fieldwork should be carried out in a cultural community of speakers,
because only by studying the culture and the grammar together can the linguist (or
ethnologist) understand either [Everett 2005: 633].
This implication seems to be another call for greater importance to be placed on the
linguistic relativity hypothesis in all fieldwork. The idea is that language and culture are
one and the same, for our purposes, because language is simply the verbal (or visual)
expression of all aspects of a culture, created within the shape of a particular cultural
lens, and inseparable from that lens. Everett is saying that to study either language or
culture without the other is to miss a very large portion of meaning behind it, leading to
an incomplete conclusion and unfounded generalizations.
Everett's next implication, however, is more of a direct assault on linguists who
have conducted cross-cultural mass comparison studies:
2. Studies that merely look for constructions to interact with a particular thesis by
looking in an unsophisticated way at data from a variety. of grammars are
fundamentally untrustworthy because they are too far removed from the original
situation. Grammars, especially those of little-studied languages, need an
understanding of the cultural matrix from which they emerged to be properly
evaluated or used in theoretical research [Everett 2005: 633].
This seems to point straight at linguists like Joseph Greenberg who have conducted mass
comparisons of grammatical features without conducting ethnographic study of the
cultures associated with those languages. Again, Everett proclaims that this type of study
is invalid because it does riot include the culture in its study oflanguage, and can
therefore produce erroneous results. Finally, the third implication provided by Everett
states,
3.

Particulars can be as important as universals. This is so because each culturegrammar pair could in principle produce tensions and interactions found nowhere
else, each case extending our understanding of the interaction of culture and
grammar [Everett 2005: 633].

III

Here Everett is arguing for both linguistic and cultural relativity. He says that the
"particulars" of each language, which set that language apart from other languages, can
illuminate the idiosyncratic results of culture-grammar interactions. This statement takes
a somewhat postmodem focus, leaning towards the idea that each culture is unique and
can only be studied via fieldwork.
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IV. Discussion
The case of the Pirahll is compelling because it reopens perpetual questions about
language, cognition and culture. These questions include the extent to which language
and culture influence one another, the extent to which language is universal and the
extent to which it is relative. It appears that Everett has set out to answer these questions
using a single extreme example, Pirahll's linguistic features. He encourages the
reevaluation of currently accepted language universals in the field oflinguistics, and in
general, Everett aims to deemphasize the study of universals and emphasize ethnographic
research. Overall, it seems like Everett is fighting for nurture over nature as the primary
influence on language. Perhaps this is a retort to the prevailing linguistic theories that
emphasize the biological roots oflanguage. Ironically, while Everett fights for nurture
ai1d relativism as the primary influence on language, his writing style unwittingly
subscribes to anachronistic ideas of "primitive thought" and cultural evolution, which fall
on the nature side of the argument.
It seems that in all of Everett's efforts to contradict the theories of Chomsky and

Hockett, Everett has exaggerated the uniqueness of some of Pirahll' s linguistic features
among the world's languages. Critics have attested that the alleged absence of color
terms, numbers, and embedding are not unique to Pirahii, nor are the absences of
genealogical depth and visual art; in fact, the absence of simpler forms of these features is
common to small-scale indigenous societies (Berlin 2005, Kay 2005, Levinson 2005,
Surrales 2005, Wiezrbicka 2005, Nevins, Pesetsky, Rodrigues 2007).
Critics have also questioned the reasoning behind the apparently absent features
ofPirahll (Surralles 2005, Pawley 2005). In other words, some critics have suggested
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that there are multiple possible sources for these phenomena, and that Everett's theory of
the immediacy of experience principle is not necessarily a correct or accurate source.
Surralles (2005) points out that in the case of the Pirahii, historical conditions, as opposed
to language, are more likely the root of a cOhstraint on thought. In light of the history of
the Amazon, particularly the period of colonization discussed in section I, historical
conditions are a likely factor in the severe geographical isolation of the Pirahii, and
perhaps in the Pirahii's linguistic and cultural isolation as well.
Pawley (2005) also questions the manner in which Everett expresses the
phenomenon of the linguistic constraints. He posits that even if Everett's immediacy of
experience principle is an accurate representation of Piraha values and does exercise
constraints on what the Pirahii talk about, it does not necessarily follow that these values
are transmitted primarily through a grammatical structure. Pawley states,
[This constraint] reflects a universal cultural-cum-linguistic tendency for
conventional concepts to get lexicalized; people develop streamlined ways of
saying familiar things. Whether constraints on what it is conventional to say are a
matter of grammar, lexicon, or idiomaticity depends on how one chooses to defme
these constructs [pawley 2005: 638-639].
In other words, Pawley asserts that a cultural value such as the ,immediacy of experience
principle could potentially be transferred not through a formalized grammatical structure,
but through a naturalized speaking habit acquired over generalizations.
Despite the disagreement over Everett's claims regarding linguistic theory, the
most controversial aspect of Everett's work lies in its implications for the Pirahii people.
While his actual claims about recursion have been considered dehumanizing to the
Pirahii, Everett's writing style has also revealed a sense of superiority and patronization
towards the tribe .. On the fIrst page of Everett's 2005 article on Pirahii grammar and

cognition,. Everett preemptively protests against the accusation that he portrays the Pirah1i

are "primitive:"
No one should draw the conclusion from this paper that the Pirah1i language is in
any way "primitive." It has the most complex verbal morphology I am aware of
and a strikingly complex prosodic system. The Pirah1i are some of the brightest,
pleasantest, most fun-loving people that I know. They absence of formal fiction,
myths, etc., does not mean that they do not or cannot joke or lie, both of which
they particularly enjoy doing at my expense, always good-naturedly. Questioning
Pirah1i's implications for the design features of human language is not at all
equivalent to questioning their intelligence or the richness of their cultural
experience and knowledge [Everett 2005: 621].
First, in response to this statement,Brent Berlin points out that complex verbal
morphology and prosody are "also typical of the languages of small, local societies with
simple cultures," which he seems to think diminishes Everett's argument against
accusations of primitivism. Second, the words Everett subsequently uses to describe the
Pirah1i, "brightest, pleasantest, most fun-loving" are adjectives for personality traits, and
do not seem to pertain to his defense against association with primitivism. These words
only seem to defend against the embarrassing assumption that individuals of small-scale
societies lack those personality traits. In addition, these adjectives hardly relate to the
Pirah1i's cognitive or linguistic abilities, and can be viewed as a subjective observations.
In my mind, Everett's use of these adjectives works against him as a distraction from the
issues at hand. This remark also provides an .example of one of many claims made by
Everett about the nature of the Pirah1i people that lacks relevant or substantial evidence to
support it.
Anna Wierzbicka asserts that regardJess of Everett's disclaimers, the content of
his research implies an alignment with "the long tradition of 'primitive thought,'"
(Wierzbicka 2005).

Ii';

Everett insists that the Pirah1f language is not in any way "primitive," but the fact
of the matter is that without a word (or wordlike element) meaning "all" speakers
could not make generalizations. Accordingly, despite his protestations, Everett is
presenting Pirah1f as "primitive" language [Wierzbicka 2005 ,comment on Everett
2005].
Brent Berlin supports Wierzbicka's perspective by pointing out that the absence
(or simple form) of certain language features, such as counting terms, color terms,
syntactic subordination and perfect tense have been linked to lower levels of cultural
complexity.
These features, among others, are commonly marked in the languages of societies
considered culturally complex in terms of standard measures such as those of
Carneiro (1970), Murdock and Provost (1973), Naroll (1956), Hays (2000), and
Marsh (1956) ... "[Everett's] general hypothesis can be traced to much of the
nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature on the languages of so-called
primitive peoples [Berlin 2005, comment on Everett2005].
Stephen Levinson also claims that Everett echoes primitive thought by portraying
the Pirah1f primarily in negative terms, showing more of what is lacking in Pirah1f than
explaining how it works and how thoughts can be communicated in such a linguistic
system. He criticizes Everett's compliments towards the Pirah1f at the end of Everett's
2005 article as arriving too late:
Having made the Pirah1f sound like the mindless bearers of an almost subhurnanly
simple culture, Everett ends with a paean to "this beautiful language and culture"
with "so much to teach us." As one ofthe few spokespersons for a small,
unempowered group, he surely has some obligation to have presented a more
balanced picture throughout [Levinson 2005, comment on Everett 2005].
In response to these criticisms, Everett states that the critics themselves are
projecting primitivism onto Everett's research (and concurrently onto the Pirah1f people)
because of the critics' own ethnocentric views of what is considered primitive.
[Surralles'] objection, (shared by Levinson), that I have portrayed the Pirah1f as
primitive in thought is ethnocentric. That language does not avail itself of

grammatical resources used in other languages neither renders it inferior to other
languages nor, as Levinson claims, makes its speakers 'mindless' [Everett 2005a].
Here Everett uses the concept of cultural relativity to defend himself against any and all
possible accusations made about his work.
After reading Everett's work I have come to the conclusion that Everett does not
intend to objectifY the Piraha as the primitive end of a linear cultural evolution paradigm.
I do hypothesize, however, that Everett's education as a missionary has engrained in him
some patronizing ideas about small-scale societies that are reflected in his writing style.
Granted, Everett has since rejected his duty as a missionary and rejected religion
altogether, and Everett does not exercise authority over the Piraha or force them to
believe in Christianity. However, his first linguistic training, and therefore hisfrrst
impressions about language, came from SIL and are inevitably grounded in missionary
ideology.
If the purpose of a Christian missionary is to deliver "truth" to a pre-literate
society, this notion presumes that a missionary (and entire religious institution) knows
best about what will benefit the society, over and above the beliefs of that society's
people. The missionary institution teaches its missionaries to act on a community with
authority and enact radical changes in thinking. While Everett does not exercise this role
anymore with the Piraha, Everett can be seen as exercising a missionary role over the
scientific community. He aims to enact radical changes in thought among linguists,
perhaps because he believes that his own experience with linguistic relativity is closer to
the "truth" about language than the established linguistic theories.
Everett made several life changing discoveries during his time with the Piraha,
particularly concerning religion and cultural/linguistic relativity. Perhaps Everett feels
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that when he previously adhered to Chomskian universal grammar during his time at SIL,
the theory prevented him from fully understanding Piraha grammar by preeminently
directing his research to fit the Chomskian framework. Perhaps he drew an emotional
connection between his education as a missionary and his education as a Chomskian
linguist. Everett's simultaneous rejection of those two schools can provide a possible
explanation for some of his fervently exaggerated language, as he made such a dramatic
change of beliefs. So perhaps Everett feels that he has a duty to help other Chomskian
believers discover the impact of culture on grammar, so they do not become caught in
what Everett perceives to be an ethnocentric way of thinking about human language.
Despite Everett's desire to educate the linguistic community about linguistic
relativity, his own concept of relativity seems slightly askew. When Everett uses
language that approaches patronization to describe the Piraha, he expresses these views
as objective observations. Take his quote above, in response to Surrales and Levinson, as
an example; Instead of hearing the negativity in his description of the Piraha, he
attributes all value judgments to the reader, or the person interpreting his observations.
Using cultural relativity as a shield, Everett essentially claims in the quote above that all
judgment of the Pirahiis' lifestyle is relative (Everett 2005a). Perhaps this reveals
Everett's own blindness to the biases of his linguistic schooling, allowing him to commit
indelicacies (almost certainly unintentionally) in his portrayals of the Piraha.
In sum, I believe that Daniel Everett'.s ethnographic research has made an
important albeit provocative contribution to the study oflinguistic relativity and the
relationships between language, cognition, and culture. While critics have observed
many areas of Everett's research to be contentious and ambiguous, the data he collected

will surely be useful to future study, and his theory has provoked deep thought on tough
issues. However, Everett's writing can be made an example of the consequences of
insensitive language choice, and can serve as a basis for dialogue on the responsibilities
of ethnographers for small-scale societies. The case of the Pirahli language, as Everett
interprets it, can be considered an exception to Chomsky's notion of syutactic recursion
as the cornerstone of human language faculty, but should not necessarily warrant the
rejection of syntactic recursion as a general trend among the world's languages. In other
words, an exception does not necessarily disprove a rule. On the other hand, exceptions
to the rules, or cultural particularities, are crucial to research concerning linguistic
relativity, and should continue to be studied in great depth for the sake of our everexpanding knowledge of human nature.
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